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Abstract
Tactical networks are typically a combination of wireless ad-hoc and mesh
networks, with varying connectivity that may also suffer from temporary
partitioning. The implemented mechanisms must provide secure and reliable
communication and service delivery, across a wide range of possible network
capabilities, structures and composing entities. Furthermore, the ability to
compose services dynamically is highly desirable, as is the possibility of
accessing services in temporarily available networks.
The adoption of the Service Oriented Architecture paradigm has been
recognized as a valuable solution towards the realization of the arising
requirements. SOA allows the loose and dynamic coupling of services,
implicitly also offering a degree of resilience where services can be
substituted if a provider becomes unavailable. In this article we therefore
explore the requirements and constraints of the implementation of the SOA
paradigm over tactical networks. Aiming to dynamic security policies where
policy decision and enforcement points can coincide and be distributed, also
incorporating situational knowledge. To allow both (partial) pre-computation
and dynamic evaluation of policies. Additionally we provide a constrained
ontology framework for the realization of dynamic security policies over this
environment, based on the identified constraints.
1 Introduction
The currently deployed tactical systems are based on contemporary Command and
Control (C2) and Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence (C4I)
structures of continuously increasing heterogeneity and complexity. Yet, the ongoing
introduction of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Network Enabled Capability (NEC),
significantly increased the requirement for consistent information exchanges, operational
flexibility and dynamic adaptation. SOA based mechanisms emerged as a suitable
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mediator, towards the achievement of these arising requirements. Thus, various studies
have evaluated the SOA paradigm, over networks with similar characteristics to the
tactical. Additionally, description logic and ontological structures have been recognised
to provide the required descriptive power and syntax, in order to capture the semantics
of complex environments, into highly enriched security policies. Yet, such mechanisms
have not been utilised within the deployed tactical networks and adapted over their distinct
characteristics.
The realisation of concrete security mechanisms dedicated to tactical SOA, has to
be based on the identification of the relevant constraints, imposed by the nature of
this environment. The findings of this procedure can concurrently be used for the
definition of the corresponding high level security functional requirements, which can
lead to the identification of the appropriate composing elements, structural formulations
and operational interactions. In this study, following the aforementioned procedure, we
present our findings regarding the constraints of tactical SOA, translate them into the
required functional characteristics and propose a suitable baseline framework for the
realisation of security infrastructures dedicated to tactical SOA.
2 Related work
The tactical environment is continuously and rapidly evolving. Thus, it has been under
extensive and diachronic study, both in terms of fundamental warfare analysis [1] and
technical evaluation [2], [3], [4], [5]. Such studies provide crucial information, useful
for the understanding and incorporation of the distinct governing conditions, into newly
designed tactical systems. The nature of the modern tactical environment, promoted
the evaluation of the SOA paradigm as a suitable mediator towards the new imposed
requirements. Various studies included the evaluation of SOA implementations with
the use of web services [6], the evaluation of SOA implementations over disadvantaged
networks [7] or tactical EDGE networks [8] including the studies of the IST-090[9]/IST-
118[10] working groups, the evaluation of existing and rising security solutions over
tactical SOA [11], as well as other perspectives, such as battle command [12].
Regarding the security perspective, multiple approaches have been defined, for the
specification of security policies, in other fields [13], [14], [15]. Yet, the most commonly
used mechanisms, such as WS-Security, Ponder [16], SAML [17] or XACML[18],
lack the ability of decentralized operation, while they suffer significant expressiveness
constraints, when implemented over open and dynamic environments, rendering them
inadequate for the tactical ecosystem. Such constraints promoted attempts to combine
these mechanisms with ontological representations and logic based systems, integrating
this way part of their extensive expressive power [19], [20], [21].
Shortly after, multiple successful efforts managed to fully utilise the expressive power
of description logic , for the complete definition of security policies and access control
systems [22], [23], [24]. Finin et al. [25] presented a mechanism for the realization of
RBAC with OWL-DL, while Kolovski et al. [26] provided a mapping mechanism of WS-
Policies to OWL-DL. Trivellato et al. [27] provided a framework for semantic vocabulary
alignment between different ontologies in coalition environments. In the same study it is
presented that both, previously established trust management (such as RT [28], cassandra
[29], Peer-Trust [30], Tulip [31]) and semantic frameworks (such as ROWLBAC [25],
REI[32], KAOS [33], Kolter et al [34]), lack either in terms of decentralised operation,
expressive capturing of semantic values or ease of development and deployment.
The successful undertaken research efforts throughout these fields, promoted the
practical application of the SOA paradigm over the strategic domain, with sufficiently
dynamic security mechanisms. Yet, the characteristics and constraints imposed by the
tactical domain, differ in great extent from those of the strategic. The defined NATO
C3 System Architecture Frameworks [35] does not incorporate a wide variety of such
constraints, such as mobility, disruption tolerance and operation over highly congested or
otherwise restricted networks, even for currently available services. The German national
project RuDi aiming to the definition of a reference service environment, reaches towards
applications and security services within the tactical domain. Yet, critical constraints such
as the limited storage capacity or computational power of the mobile tactical nodes are
not taken under consideration. Furthermore, the international project CoNSIS, focuses on
improving and adapting existing enterprise service bus infrastructures into highly mobile
networks, without utilizing the known benefits of ontological constructs for security
mechanisms.
3 The tactical environment
The tactical environment is eminently dynamic, versatile and diverse, depending
immensely on the nature of each particular tactical operation.
1. The multitude of the deployed assets may vary from a team of two dismounted
soldiers, up to a few thousand elements.
2. The tactical network is required to serve over a highly heterogeneous ecosystem,
due to the diverse nature, capabilities and requirements of the deployed platforms.
This diversity is presented in various terms, that include mobility, computational
power, storage capacity, autonomy, communication capabilities and physical
security.
3. Another aspect is the operational and functional diversity of the deployed elements.
The various nodes within an Area Of Operation (AoO) are organised in discrete
yet interoperable operational groups, with distinct characteristics, operational
requirements and goals. Similarly, the elements that constitute these groups, have
distinct functional roles and capabilities through a tactical operation.
4. A plethora of information is available within the tactical network, generated by
the involved elements, including users, services and equipment. Yet, these blocks
of information are of broad dissimilarity in terms that include their nature (Alerts,
orders, tactical information), type (data, voice, chat, signalling), format, generation
frequency or their required quality, reliability and security features.
5. The structure of the tactical environment is highly dynamic, with rapidly changing
topology, since new nodes may ender or exit the network at will, while the
existing actors move freely within the AoO. Thus, no safe assumptions can be
made regarding the existence of continuous connectivity, while extensive delays,
communication failures, random network splits/ merges and uncertain service
delivery must be expected.
6. The dynamic nature of the tactical environment is further aggravated since some
of the deployed actors may be required to operate in coalition environments
with discrete security mechanisms, radio silence, low detection, anti jam or low
interception status.
7. The presence of adversaries must be considered certain. Their competence should
be expected to extend throughout a wide variety of active and passive attacks,
including communication disruption, targeted physical attacks and information
extraction attempts.
These characteristics clarify the unique nature of the tactical environment, even
towards the closely related systems focusing on the strategic domain, while they delineate
the additional challenges of coping with the involved dynamics.
4 The security perspective of tactical SOA
The combination of the aforementioned constraints can be used to clarify and construct
the required functional characteristics of the implemented security mechanisms. These
functional characteristics form a parallel iteration of requirements in addition to a set of
security goals based on a refined and properly adapted version of the Parkerian Hexad
(Confidentiality, Control, Integrity, Authenticity, Availability, and Utility), which can be
common for the tactical and the strategic domains. These additional elements require
appropriately formulated security mechanisms, since distributed SOA was not designed
for such a dynamic environment.
1. The realised security mechanisms have to be highly scalable, incorporating at the
same time the various SOA platform service layers alongside with the Quality of
Service, communication and infrastructure levels. Thus, requiring an adaptable
multilayer implementation.
2. The definition, update, evaluation, enforcement and transmission of security
policies must be based on a scalable and dynamic combination of the available
resources and cross layer information. This can ensure service delivery, based on
dynamic adaptation of the available security mechanisms.
3. The security enforcement procedures must incorporate real time evaluation of the
existing tactical conditions, allowing the most suitable utilization of the security
policy, taking under consideration the heterogeneity of the involved elements.
4. Due to operational and functional diversity of the deployed elements, the
implemented security mechanisms must support the dynamic distribution of both
the security policy and the governing conditions. This allows the extension of
the overall system scalability, minimises the potential risk due to a compromised
node and by promoting node interoperability, allows the complete utilization
of the specific capabilities of each tactical node. Furthermore, the security
policy distribution can be used in order to promote the identification of occurring
collisions, that may require reconciliation.
5. Additionally, due to the constant alterations in terms of connectivity, available
bandwidth and network topology, no centralized security dedicated entity can be
assumed to operate over the tactical network, since these characteristics raise
various constraints, affecting the number of possible invocations or the transmission
of complex policy expressions. Thus, the implemented security mechanisms and
services must be distributed across all the deployed network elements.
6. Protection mechanisms must be realised regarding both service access and the
various objects attached to the services. These mechanisms must incorporate
simplified policy expressions or pre-calculated policy decisions, maintaining the
capability to evolve into dynamic and on-line evaluated multi-level security
constructs, when information and resources are available. This can permit the
standalone operation of nodes in a highly disrupted environment and reassures the
operation of disadvantaged nodes due to limited resources.
5 Dynamic security policies over tactical SOA
As presented at section 2, the use of description logic for the formalization of security
policies, has been widely proposed and successfully implemented in various domains.
Yet, it has not been appropriately adopted and utilised for the specifics of tactical
networks. In this article we propose the use of OWL-DL and its fragments to define a
baseline security policy framework, appropriately adapted to the aforementioned specifics
of the tactical environment. The decision of selecting OWL-DL is based (as presented
at section 2) on the known vulnerabilities of other mechanisms into capturing the
required semantics, operating over highly dynamic and distributed environments or ease
of development and deployment.
Structuring security policies for tactical SOA
In a tactical SOA the services are orchestrated in order to support every mission aspect,
while the deployed nodes are both service providers and consumers. The proposed
framework is presented at figure 1. This allows the unambiguous definition of the various
tactical domains (including but not limited to planning, protection, diligence, response
and detection), capabilities (including but not limited to core, application, communication
and inter-domain), the various actions towards these capabilities and the governing rules
of these actions. The proposed structure minimises tree impurities within the security
core ontology, something that reduces the overall complexity, inherently affecting the
complexity of policy distribution and reconciliation procedures.
Figure 1: Security policy structure.
The construction of the required security policy incorporates a distributed database
for the definition of the governing rules, including the wide plethora of static or dynamic
multi-domain information available within the tactical network, based on the requirements
of each operation. Such information can refer to various attributes regarding the nature
and requirements of the involved actors, the real time and past operational conditions
of the network (including resource availability) and the occurring element actions and
interactions. These information, in order to maintain the purity of the security ontology,
must be layered as referring to 1-Services, 2-Information, 3-Network status, 4-Radio
status, 5-Node status, 6-Subjects.
The proposed structure allows for a dual notion of dynamism, regarding the operation
of the overall security policy. The first dynamic characteristic occurs by the definition
of the rules corresponding to each action. Each rule-set spans from simple pre-calculated
expressions, that allow the operation of nodes with limited resources, towards expressions
of increased complexity, that incorporate a variable set of static and dynamic information,
in order to maintain support of security services as the tactical mission evolves. The
second dynamic characteristic occurs by the definition and complex relationships of the
dedicated Domain, Capability and Action sub-structures. These elements exploiting
the expressive power of description logic, proceed to on-line evaluation of the current
network status, based on the defined information, after every service invocation. Thus,
achieving the selection of the appropriate governing rule or suggesting a suitable service
substitution.
Conceptualization of tactical policy framework
The ontological conceptualization of the described framework, over the hierarchical
structure of a tactical network, can be achieved by the use of unary and binary predicates.
Unary predicates within the defined context represent data, services, users, terminals
and conditions, while binary predicates represent the possible relationships among them.
Thus, a broad definition of a network can be achieved by defining the distinct elements
and their relations, structuring an interpretation of the current and past status of the overall
ecosystem.
The definition of the required tactical terminology is achieved by T-box definitions.
The T-Box allows the unique and acyclic concept definition in terms of sufficient and
necessary conditions. Thus, each of the defined concepts throughout the required tactical
domains, is gradually structured through a complex combination of atomic concepts that
declare these conditions. A-Box role on the contrary is oriented to instance identification,
specifying whether a specific individual is an instance of the concepts defined within the
T-Box. This is primarily achieved by concept and role assertions. It must be noted at this
point, that the required concept expressiveness may affect the overall computational and
reasoning complexity. Additionally, the assertional knowledge is defined at the A-Box at
the initiation of the operation for the static elements, while the dynamic elements evolve
as the tactical operation progresses. This flexibility is exploited by the proposed model,
in order to make best use of the dynamic semantic information for policy decisions. Thus
a knowledge base is defined as a structured pair of a T-Box and an A-box (T/A). This
procedure is presented at figure 2. When the complete tactical terminology has been
constructed, assertional knowledge such as Has_Current_Status, Can_Be_Substituted and
Has_Provider, can be constructed and altered on-line, in order to define or identify a
specific service as an instance.
Figure 2: Security policy conceptualization.
Formal representation of security policies and situational knowledge
The formal representation of the described security policy framework, requires a
description logic fragment, with sufficient expressive power to accommodate the
definition of the various static and dynamic elements and their complex relations. The
selected DL-fragment, has been identified that in order to achieve the adequate and
precise capturing of the involved semantics must be based on ALC , but also include
the additional elements of role hierarchy, nominals, inversion, cardinality, functionality
properties, qualified cardinality restrictions and role inclusion. A suitable DL-fragment
is SH OIN (D) that includes all the aforementioned elements in addition to
supplementary data related properties and values. Furthermore, SH OIN (D)
represents a fragment of OWL DL [36], it is supported by widely used ontology
editors, such as Protege, while a plethora of efficient reasoners exist. The core of
SH OIN (D) relies on the common syntax outlined by one of the basic description
logic fragments called (Attribute Language with Complements). And provides the
following constructors:
(Name) Description Syntax
1 (Top) Universal concept >
2 (Bottom) Empty concept ⊥
3 Atomic concept A
4 Concept union unionsq
5 Concept intersection u
6 Concept negation ¬
7 Universal value restriction ∀
8 Limited existential restriction ∃
9 (Cardinality) Unqualified value restrictions ≤ ,≥ ,= (n R)
10 (Cardinality) Qualified value restrictions ≤ ,≥ ,= (n R.C)
11 Nominals {i1 . . . in}
12 Atomic role hierarchy and inverse roles R, R−1
13 Sub-role ⊆
14 Universal role assertion ∪
15 Sub-class v
16 Equivalence ≡
17 Inversion −
The full list of the semantics supported by OWL-DL and the suggested description
logic fragment can be seen at [37]. As presented earlier the terminology of the tactical
network is defined within the T-Box and may contain simplified or complex expressions
such as:
Service≡ individualu∃has_Service_ID.⊥ (1)
Service_Type1≡ Serviceu∃Has_Functionality.Messagingu∃Has_Status.Online (2)
Available_Service≡ Service(≤ 1Has_Local_Providerunionsq (≥
2Has_Local_Provideru∃Has_Local_Provider.Active)) (3)
Instance identification within the A-Box can be achieved primarily by concept and role
assertions, using the presented constructors as:
FileuText(msg1) : msg1 is a text f ile (concept assertion)
hasSource(msg1,Service1) : Service1 is the source o f msg1 (role assertion)
(4)
Thus, defining services, information, nodes and subjects as individuals, can be achieved
using simple world definitions, over static and dynamic information, over the universal A
box as:
Has_Given_Name(UserA,Nikolaos)
Has_ID(UserA,522091)
Has_Rank(UserA,Captain)
Has_Current_Location(UserA,AoO1)
Has_Operational_Group(UserA,OG2)
(5)
Moreover, the relationships among the network entities can be defined using various
deterministic or probabilistic membership assertions, as presented in equations (4).
Similarly, the current user of a node, the resource availability of a terminal, the operational
state of a service and the rest of the available information regarding the defined domains
can be represented.
The construction of the required policy expression branches, based on the described
framework, can be organized in discrete requirement sets that correspond to distinct
security levels as:
Node_Can_Be_Accessed(Node1;Node_Requirements_Set-1)
...
Node_Can_Be_Accessed(Node1;Node_Requirements_Set-n)
Other policy domains, referring for example to service substitution, can also be defined
similarly as:
Service_Can_Be_Substituted(Service_Type_1;Service_Substitution_Set-1
...
Service_Can_Be_Substituted(Service_Type_1;Service_Substitution_Set-n
Additionally to Terminology/Assertion pairs (T/A) that can be defined using the available
constructors, rules can also be used for knowledge representation. The use of rules
significantly increases the expressive power, allowing the definition of additional security
constraints such as separation of duty. A triplet in the form of (T/A/R) can be used for
the definition of more complex relations within the tactical environment. A rule can be
defined having the form:
KPrivatev ∀Uses.NodeTypeA (6)
Stating that all the individuals who are defined within the A-Box to have rank equivalent
to private, make use of a specific type of node, defined as NodeTypeA within the T-Box.
6 Scenario
To illustrate the identified dynamics of the tactical environment and the corresponding
functionalities of the defined framework let us assume the following scenario.
• Entity A requires service B.
• Entity A requires service B to satisfy a set of properties X and service provider to
satisfy a set of properties K.
• Service B is provided by nodes C and D.
• Node C offers properties set X, while node D offers properties sets X and Y.
• The property sets are evaluated and node C is selected as the service provider.
• Entity A is evaluated by node C, since node C and service B require every invoking
entity to satisfy a minimum set of requirements Z.
• Node C identifies that will become unavailable. Entity A is informed and service
delivery is delegated to node D.
Entity A may be a user or another service defined based on the network terminology, as
presented in figure 2, based on concept and role assertions, similar to those of Equation 5.
Similarly, service B and nodes C, D are equally defined following the same procedure.
Thus, entity A queries the local knowledge base, in order to identify a service and a
service provider that complies with the corresponding requirement sets X and K. The
requirement sets and the queries towards the knowledge base, are a set of the defined
policy rules, appropriately selected by the corresponding Domain, Capability and Action
substructures, as presented in figure 1.
The structure of these substructures, is of high significance at this point, since the
deduction capacity of the node and the available resources, at the time of the query
initiation, are used to define the maximum complexity of the policy expression used to
identify the service/ service provider. Thus, the policy expression might be a precomputed
value, a simplified expression, or expressions of increased complexity, incorporating
multiple combinations of static and dynamic information.
Assuming that both nodes C and D, return from the query as providers of the
service related requirements set X, the service provider can be selected based on the
node/network/radio related requirements set K. Thus, in this simplified scenario, node C
is selected as the service provider, based among others due to current resource availability
and because it belongs to the same operational group with entity A (Providing this way a
higher probability of maintaining closer proximity for longer period).
Similarly, upon receipt of the service invocation, node C makes use of the
corresponding policy branch in order to evaluate the defined set of parameters regarding
the various domains. Thus, entity A is evaluated as a legitimate user, while network,
node, radio and other parameters are also evaluated in order to identify the feasibility of
the request and the most suitable serving approach.
After negotiation of the interaction parameters among the entity A and node C, based
on the specified security policy branches, the service delivery is initiated. An additional
advantage of the described framework, resulting from the on-line evaluation of various
dynamic and static information, is the evaluation of the interaction itself, making possible
to identify and anticipate possible parameter alterations. Thus, service delivery can be
delegated by node C to node B, based on the previously established interaction agreement
among entity A and node D.
7 Conclusions
Through this article, the findings of our study regarding the constraints imposed by the
nature of tactical SOA implementations have been presented. These constraints have
been translated into the corresponding functional requirements for the implementation
of security mechanisms dedicated to tactical networks. Furthermore, a security policy
framework of suitable structural characteristics has been suggested, making use of
the expressive power of description logic and ontological constructs, for the sufficient
realisation of these requirements.
Our future plans include the further evaluation and refinement of the proposed
framework. More precisely the study of how the structure of the higher level ontological
constructs can affect the efficiency and efficacy of the overall mechanism. Early
results suggest that the structure of the ontological constructs is critical, in order to
fully exploit the expressive power provided by description logic, minimize resource
utilization and achieve compact security policy definition and reasoning. Additionally,
we intent to identify suitable mechanisms for the apriory distribution, on-line update and
reconciliation of the security policy, aiming to maximize the node cooperation, while
minimizing and allocating the computational cost of each policy decision.
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